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Parental separation – shared care – social norms and practices – policy development 
This article explores how shared care following parental separation or divorce has 
developed in law and policy over the past 25 years, identifying five phases of evolution. It 
traces the development of shared care as social norm and as social practice, and the 
interrelationship between the research evidence on shared care and case law and policy. 
It explores two of the drivers for these developments: the body of research evidence on 
shared care and the role played by different ideas or ‘frames’ surrounding shared care – 
‘welfare’, ‘rights’, ‘risk’ and ‘resources’ – and concludes that current case-law is 
significantly more supportive of shared care than either the current policy framework or 
the existing research base. 
Introduction 
‘We created awareness and stimulated debate about the institutionalised 
discrimination against fathers in the legal system. But we didn’t get the law 
changed … What we have done is climate change. The debate has started.’ 
Matt O’Connor (founder of Fathers 4 Justice)  
This article1 explores how shared care following parental separation or divorce has 
developed in law and policy in the 25 years since the foundation of the Child and Family 
Law Quarterly (CFLQ). It tracks the evolution of shared care across five phases or 
periods: from a period of Rarity (mid 80s to early 90s), through Expansion (mid 90s to 
2000) and Politicisation (2000s) to Internationalisation (2010–2012) and ending in 
Symbolism (2012 onwards). It is a story of growth, with more public awareness, more 
court orders and ever more academic interest in shared care over time.2 It is also a 
complex story befitting a highly contentious subject. Matt O’Connor cited above is 
probably correct when he notes that there is a disjunction between changes in public 
perceptions and changes in the law. The article therefore traces the varying development 
as well as the interrelationship between shared care as social norm and as social practice, 
and between the research evidence on shared care and case-law and policy. The overall 
conclusion is that current case-law is significantly more supportive of shared care than 
either the current policy framework or the existing research base; similarly social norms 
appear to have become more positive about shared care than is reflected in the increase in 
shared time arrangements amongst the separated population.  
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The second aim of the article is to explore two of the drivers for these developments: the 
body of research evidence on shared care and the role played by different ideas or 
‘frames’ surrounding shared care. The concept of ‘frames’ is a widely used tool in recent 
interpretivist approaches to policy analysis.3 The basic premise of the approach is that 
social problems do not appear naturally on the policy agenda but are socially constructed 
or ‘framed’ by policy actors. In effect what policy actors do is select some social issues 
as significant, as ‘policy problems’, leaving other social issues aside. In doing so policy 
actors are also constructing how those issues should be understood. Typically that 
framing will include, or be predicated upon, a particular policy solution. Thus a frame 
defines what is (and is not) a problem and how those problems are defined, and 
presupposes policy solutions to the problem.  
In relation to shared care there have been two dominant frames, both associated with 
different policy actors and policy networks. In the welfare frame the social problem is 
identified as the vulnerability of children following parental separation, particularly the 
impact of ongoing conflict and parental disputes on children’s wellbeing. The policy 
solution is to help parents to address those disputes effectively in a way that reduces 
children’s exposure to conflict. Thus courts should retain an important residual role but 
alternative dispute resolution plus information, advice and education should be made 
available to enable parents to focus on children’s needs. Associated with this frame is the 
need for individualised decision-making based on the needs of the individual child. In 
many respects the welfare frame is the default position of the family justice system frame 
(underpinned by the paramountcy principle), but was also strongly associated with the 
last Labour government.  
In contrast, in the rights frame the social problem of divorce is identified as fathers 
denied any or full involvement in their children’s lives as a result of hostile/bitter resident 
mothers and/or weak or biased family courts. The policy solution is to treat mothers and 
fathers equally, to abolish the distinction between ‘resident’ and ‘contact’ parents and to 
move to shared or equal parenting after divorce and separation. In contrast to the 
individualised decision-making of the welfare frame, the rights frame is associated with a 
preference for presumptive or rule-based decision-making. A relatively wide group has 
deployed a rights frame, including numerous fathers groups,4 a significant number of 
tabloid and broadsheet journalists and the Conservative and (to a lesser extent) the 
Liberal Democrat parties both in Opposition and as Coalition government partners. 
The welfare and rights frames have existed in tension throughout the last 25 years. Two 
other frames have been important, though are less central to the debates on shared care. 
In the risk frame the key policy problem is constructed as a powerful contact presumption 
putting the safety of mothers and children at risk in domestic violence cases, prompting a 
policy goal of a rebuttable presumption of no contact in risk cases. The risk frame was 
most visible in the early 2000s with a tight inter-professional network of Women’s Aid, 
NSPCC and Labour backbenchers /peers. A fourth Resources or Diversion frame 
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provides a wider backdrop for all three welfare, rights and risk frames. In this frame, 
subscribed to by all governments over the last 20 years or more, the social problem is 
framed as the family courts and family lawyers offering an expensive and ineffective 
method of resolving family disputes. The solution is to preserve public resources by 
containing/reducing the role of courts and lawyers primarily through settlement and 
alternative dispute resolution and (latterly) restricting the availability of legal aid in 
private law cases.  
Before tracing the evolution of shared care and the influence of the four frames, it is 
important to clarify the scope of the term ‘shared care’. In this article shared care is used 
as an umbrella term to cover the involvement of both parents in a child’s life post-
separation. It can be used variously to refer to a social construct or norm (that both 
parents should be involved in children’s lives), the actual division of a child’s time 
between parents on a more or less equal basis (shared time or alternating residence), a 
court order (for example, a shared residence order which may or may not reflect an equal 
division of time), involvement of both parents in decision-making albeit not necessarily 
as a joint process (parental responsibility, joint legal custody) and finally as co-parenting 
or working together as parents in a parental alliance. In this article I explore how certain 
definitions or understandings of shared care became prominent at different times among 
different constituencies, but focusing particularly on shared time or alternating residence.  
Rarity – late 1980s to mid 1990s  
The foundation of the CFLQ coincided with major reform of custody law initiated by the 
Law Commission in the mid 1980s and subsequently enacted in the Children Act 1989. 
The reforms to custody law in the late 80s introduced significant changes in relation to 
shared parenting, at least as regards shared decision-making, as well as providing a very 
modest impetus for shared time in appropriate cases.  
The Law Commission working paper in 19865 reflected a widespread opinion that the 
current regime of custody, care and control and access was unclear, inconsistent and 
unfair.6 Writing at the time, Julia Brophy7 noted that a diverse collection of voices, 
including the newly established Families Need Fathers and legal academics, had been 
pressing for a change in the law since the early 80s. The main demand was for a 
presumption of joint legal custody. At the time only 13% of divorce petitions ended with 
joint (legal) custody, with the great majority of orders made for sole custody to the wife.8  
In its initial proposals, the Law Commission decided against recommending joint 
custody. Instead it proposed a new regime of parental responsibility to address decision-
making. The Commission also floated the idea of a single order for care and control to 
both parents with the court simply to determine the ‘allocation of the child’s time 
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between his parents’.9 One of the rationales for the proposal was based on an equality 
argument, that it avoided ‘invidious allocations of power and responsibilities between 
parents … that one parent is better or more fit than the other, simply the child is able to 
spend more time with one or the other’.10 Interestingly it took 25 years for this proposal 
to be adopted as part of amendment to the Children Act 1989 envisaged by the Children 
and Families Act 2014.11  
The Commission also thought that the single order might give some implicit 
encouragement towards a ‘more equal distribution of time’ and that such arrangements 
could be encouraged, albeit with the crucial proviso that both parents must agree.12 The 
proposal was a clear shift from the position adopted by the Court of Appeal in the leading 
case at the time of Riley v Riley where May LJ though that a child ‘going backwards each 
week between mother and father, with no single settled home, is prima facie wrong’,13 
even though the arrangement had worked well for 5 years.14  
Research for the Law Commission suggested in fact that shared time or shared physical 
custody was even less common than joint legal custody. In a detailed study of 10 courts 
Priest and Whybrow found only 0.4% orders for shared care and control (or joint physical 
custody) out of 612 joint (legal) custody orders.15 At least part of the reason for the low 
numbers is a degree of judicial disapproval of such arrangements. The Court of Appeal’s 
concerns about stability and not having a single settled home appear to have been shared 
by judges in the lower courts. Interviews with judges revealed considerable caution about 
sharing, primarily related to children having no primary caretaker with whom they had a 
‘secure base camp’ and concern that frequent moves would be disruptive to education, 
friendships and a sense of identity.16 Some judges were more positive and could identify 
particular circumstances where shared time could work, for example where parents were 
still co-resident, worked shift patterns or children were at boarding school.17 
The working paper’s suggestion that more equal allocations of time could be encouraged 
was therefore something of a departure from existing practice, but as Kaganas and Piper18 
point out, the Commission was still ruling out any presumption of joint physical custody. 
Indeed the working paper did recognise that there were multiple potential problems with 
shared time, including the practicability of arrangements, the possible burden of constant 
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moving on the child and the potential opposition of one parent and the child.19 The 
emphasis was therefore on the need for parental agreement and numbers were therefore 
always likely to be low.  
In its final report in 1988 the Law Commission retained the proposal for ‘equal parental 
responsibility’20 but replaced the proposal for a single ‘care and control’ time share order 
with the familiar menu of residence, contact, specific issues and prohibited steps orders. 
The rationale for the change of position was that a single order would be impracticable, 
as it would require the court to make defined orders in every case when most cases 
resulted in reasonable access.21 However, it is also clear that the proposal had provoked 
much concern that it implied an equal division of time. The Commission noted that it was 
‘never our intention’ to suggest an equal time division and indeed that such arrangements 
‘will rarely be practicable, let alone for the children’s benefit’.22 However, the 
Commission also noted that US research had indicated that shared time could work well 
and so should not be ‘actively discouraged’. It proposed, therefore that a residence order 
could be made to both parents (later termed a shared residence order) if that is a ‘more 
realistic description of the responsibilities involved’.23  
The Law Commission’s proposals for parental responsibility, the menu of residence and 
contact orders and shared residence order were all subsequently enacted in the Children 
Act 1989.24 It was evident, however, that the area was something of a battlefield as one of 
the Law Commissioners later described the Commission’s task of reconciling the 
competing views of parents, academics and legal professionals.25 Some feminists writing 
at the time expressed concern about using custody law to achieve equal child care 
responsibilities without addressing prior structural inequalities within intact 
relationships.26 Those concerns were to reappear later. It is also worth noting that 
concerns that ‘joint parenting’ would be misunderstood as equality/time-sharing were 
also to feature heavily during the passage of the Children and Families Act 2014.  
The Children Act 1989 introduced a potentially more expansive regime on shared care 
than previously, although the intention or expectation was always that numbers would be 
limited by practicalities and the need for parental co-operation. Writing several years 
after implementation the former Law Commissioner Brenda Hoggett (as she then was) 
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still thought that the Act would be unlikely to lead to a significant increase in father 
involvement.27 Rather the focus was very much on shared parenting as (equal) parental 
responsibility rather than as shared time.28  
In fact the early years of the Children Act did not result in a great expansion of shared 
residence orders. Hoggett reported in 1994 that they might be increasing but were ‘still 
rare’.29 She suggested that the Court of Appeal decision in J v J30 where shared time was 
seen as ‘wholly exceptional’ had set the tone. Those ‘wholly exceptional’ features were 
an already established and successful pattern of shared time and parental agreement and 
co-operation.31 Stephen Gilmore32 also highlights the significance of Children Act 
Guidance which suggested that the ‘need the stability of a single home’ and the 
requirement for parental agreement meant that shared residence orders would not be 
common orders.33  
At the start of the 1990s, therefore, it could be argued that the changes introduced by the 
Children Act 1989 was beginning to recognise the changing roles of men and their 
increased role as caregivers.34 However, shared parenting in the form of shared time 
remained rare given the emphasis placed on the need for parental co-operation and 
practical arrangements.  
Expansion – mid 1990s to early 2000s  
From the mid 1990s onward there were modest developments in shared care across 
several domains: social practice, research, statute and case law. There is some limited 
indication that the numbers of children in shared time arrangements were increasing 
slowly, albeit from a very small base. Fieldwork by Bradshaw35 et al in the mid nineties 
found that 4.8% of non-resident fathers reported a shared time arrangement, most 
commonly a half week with each parent.  
There was also the start of much greater academic interest in shared parenting and in the 
outcomes of shared time for children. Two articles published in CFLQ in the mid 1990s 
echoed judicial concerns about high conflict and hostility as contra-indications for shared 
time. A review of the limited body of psychosocial research by Jan Pryor and Fred 
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Seymour36 concluded that joint (physical) custody could work and work better than sole 
custody, but was dependent upon low or contained conflict and parental willingness to 
co-operate.37 Caroline Bridge38 took a similar and possibly more cautious line in her 
comparison of New Zealand and UK case-law and court practice. She was very critical of 
the New Zealand courts for ordering shared residence in high conflict cases, noting that 
even with highly detailed court orders, separate representation for children and ongoing 
therapy there were still significant burdens placed on children. Bridge’s article was the 
first of many in CFLQ that drew on the experiences of shared time in other jurisdictions.  
A radically different position was taken by Arthur Baker and Peter Townsend.39 Their 
position paper was probably the first UK academic paper making a strong case for shared 
care as time-sharing rather than joint legal custody, shared parental responsibility or the 
‘demeaning’ concept of contact. They argued for ‘substantial amounts of time living with 
each parent’ from 30/70 to 50/50 splits.40 They raised the possibility of a shared time 
presumption though stopped short of advocating it.41 Baker and Townsend suggested that 
there was growing enthusiasm for shared time with the primary obstacles being judicial 
conservatism, lack of social work enthusiasm, gendered cultural assumptions about men 
and women and feminism.42 Their paper is clearly positioned within a rights frame, in 
contrast to the welfare frames of Bridge and Pryor and Seymour. Their paper had very 
little impact within the academic community where the welfare frame has been dominant, 
but the sentiments were increasingly echoed in the public sphere. 
As academics debated, there were further developments in the legal framework. It has 
recently been rather overlooked, but in the mid 1990s parliament did go further than the 
Children Act 1989 and enacted what was in effect a presumption of regular contact. 
Section 11(c) of the Family Law Act 1996 stated that in divorce proceedings: 
‘the welfare of the child will be best served by—  
(i)  his having regular contact with those who have parental responsibility 
for him and with other members of his family; and  
(ii) the maintenance of as good a continuing relationship with his parents as 
is possible.’43  
Section 11(c) had its origins in an amendment put forward by the Conservative peer 
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Baroness Elles,44 later accepted by the Conservative Lord Chancellor and without any 
apparent opposition in parliament.45 That part of the Family Law Act 1996 was, of 
course, never implemented. The section would in any case fall short of a presumption of 
shared time but it did move significantly further than the Children Act 1989 and suggests 
that a shared parenting ethos in its widest sense was becoming the norm.  
At the same time there were significant shifts in the rapidly developing case-law on 
shared residence orders. In an important article in CFLQ Peter Graham Harris and Robert 
George46 critically assessed how the Court of Appeal in the mid 1990s spearheaded a 
move from making shared residence orders to reflect the reality of (broadly) equal 
arrangements to making symbolic shared residence orders to confer status or a sense of 
equal authority. The process they argue began with Re H where despite a very unequal 
division of time between the parents a shared residence order was seen as of ‘practical 
therapeutic importance’.47 Harris and George argue that the use of shared residence 
orders as a symbol of equality was linked to the downgrading of parental responsibility 
by the Court of Appeal: ‘[a]s parental responsibility has been diluted, shared residence 
orders have arguably come to represent the new way of giving separated parents equal 
authority’.48 This was in stark contrast to the Law Commission’s intentions for (equal) 
parental responsibility to be the cornerstone of shared parenting.49  
The Court of Appeal also led the way in expanding the circumstances where a shared 
residence order would be used. In Re D Hale LJ reiterated that a shared residence order 
should reflect the reality but that no further gloss on the Children Act 1989 (such as 
‘unusual’ or ‘exceptional’) was required.50 Both Gilmore51 and Harris-Short52 see the 
decision in Re D as a turning point, Harris-Short arguing that shared residence orders 
would subsequently be used in a wide range of circumstances, including those such as 
across long distances and amidst intense parental conflict, which had formerly operated 
as bars to shared residence orders.53  
Politicisation – 2000s  
If the issue of shared parenting had been gradually building in the 1990s, from 2000 
onward fathers’ rights and shared parenting suddenly gripped the public consciousness. 
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The issue became highly politicised with the major parties split over the issue as the 
Labour Government stuck to a welfare frame while the Conservative Party adopted a 
rights/equality frame. At the same time the terms of the debate switched from a focus on 
shared parenting and shared decision-making to the question of shared time and 50/50 
splits. However, despite 10 years of continuous policy review, by the end of the decade 
there had been little change at policy level although significantly greater public 
awareness for the issue and the further advance of shared residence orders in the courts. 
The decade opened with domestic violence and risk rather than rights dominating the 
policy agenda. A review led by Sir Nicholas Wall found that courts were putting women 
and children at risk by ordering unsupervised contact in domestic violence cases. The 
report proposed guidelines for the courts rather than the New Zealand style rebuttable 
presumption of no contact in risk cases proposed by domestic violence campaigners.54 
For the rest of the decade the policy debate was dominated by a rights rather than risk 
frame.55  
Following the Domestic Violence report, the Children Act Sub-Committee (CASC) 
turned their attention to the issues of contact raised by fathers’ rights campaigners. As 
with risk, CASC rejected the presumption approach advocated by campaigners. The 2002 
Making Contact Work56 report instead reframed rights demands into welfare frame 
relationship problems, making recommendations for parent education to make contact 
work and some further enforcement powers.57 At the same time, however, the report 
noted the ‘fundamental assault’ on the concept of ‘contact’ by fathers’ rights groups and 
their demand for ‘shared care’.58 In Appendix 3 CASC suggested that the government 
might consider a pilot where a few courts could trial the (greater) use of shared residence 
orders.59 
It took 2 years for the government to produce its full response to Making Contact Work. 
In this policy vacuum debate rapidly became more polarised. Kaganas and Piper60 raised 
concerns that the CASC report had resurrected debates about shared parenting that they 
argue that the Law Commission had previously rejected. The dominant story, however, 
was the rise of the fathers’ rights lobby. The formation of Fathers 4 Justice (F4J) in early 
2003 and a sequence of high profile publicity stunts throughout 2003–2004 immediately 
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attracted extensive and largely favourable press coverage.61 Later in the year Bob 
Geldof’s widely-publicised call for a 50/50 presumption signalled how far the debate had 
shifted.62  
In early 2004 the government response to Making Contact Work was finally published.63 
It was an attempt to build policy based on consensus and research evidence, and was very 
much within a welfare frame focused on addressing parental conflict and parental 
responsibilities rather than rights.64 A further review of policy was announced.  
The failure to accede to any of the fathers’ groups demands generated an angry response, 
with the comments of a former editor of The Guardian capturing the tone of the period 
and the salience of a rights frame:  
‘So this week, vociferous fathers who want to share their children are bitterly 
disappointed. What do they demand? Their 50-50 rights, their designated half 
of their own kids. … Climb more cranes, lads. This dads’ army is getting 
desperate.’65  
Further F4J events occurred, including the flour bombing of the prime minister in 
parliament and scaling of Buckingham Palace, all resulting in worldwide press 
coverage.66 Even sections of the traditionally Labour-supporting (and thus welfare frame-
oriented) media were generally supportive of the fathers’ rights message.67 Richard 
Collier68 astutely noted how the fathers’ rights movement were shaping both ‘the broader 
cultural context in which debates about family law’ were taking place and creating 
pressure for reform.  
The government nonetheless remained committed to a welfare frame based on retaining 
welfare paramountcy and individualised decision-making for children. In retrospect, it is 
apparent that the government adopted two different approaches to counter the increasing 
dominance of the rights frame. The first was to reframe rights initiatives into welfare. 
This was evident in the ill-fated Family Resolutions Pilot. Following the CASC 
suggestion for a shared residence order pilot, an ad hoc group of judges and fathers’ 
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rights campaigners had developed a proposal for a ‘Florida model’ pilot that worked on 
the presumption of a default 30% time share, clearly within a rights frame. The pilot that 
was implemented by the government, however, was firmly located within a welfare-
frame with no reference to time divisions and instead a focus on both parents attending a 
programme designed to facilitate co-operation. Supporters of the original project were 
dismayed.69  
The second approach was to embark on a protracted process of legislation on relatively 
minor or side issues. This process began with a Green Paper in July 2004 and resulted in 
the Children and Adoption Act 2006.70 The Green Paper firmly rejected any statutory 
presumption of contact or ‘equal rights to equal time’, asserting the need for 
individualised decision-making,71 and arguing that any change was unnecessary as 
parents were already equal and the law ensured that children would have a meaningful or 
worthwhile relationship.72 The government proposed instead to use parenting plans to 
help parents cooperate, further use of court-based dispute resolution to tackle disputes 
and legislation to tackle enforcement.  
While the government retained its opposition to any amendment to the paramountcy 
principle, the Justice Select Committee and the cross-party Joint Scrutiny Committee on 
the Draft Children (Contact) and Adoption Bill both recommended that the welfare 
checklist might be amended to include reference to the importance of sustaining a 
relationship with both parents.73 Neither committee was in favour of a statutory division 
of time. In reply the government noted it was considering whether to codify the principle 
of the importance of a ‘meaningful relationship’ already existing in case-law into primary 
legislation.74 The government reported eventually that it could not find ‘a form of words 
that would send such a signal to the courts without moving the focus of legislation away 
from the fundamental principle that the welfare of the child is paramount’.75  
The question of a presumption split the parties. The Labour government, supported by an 
active lobby of children’s charities, consistently adopted a welfare frame; the 
Conservative frontbench, supported by fathers’ rights groups, consistently put forward a 
string of rights-oriented amendments to the Children and Adoption Bill. These included a 
presumption of ‘substantial parenting time’, of ‘reasonable and substantial contact’,76 of 
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‘at least a third time’ or that each parent is ‘as fully and equally involved in his parenting 
as possible’.77 All were defeated, as was a proposal to add ‘reasonable contact’ to both 
the welfare checklist78 and to any official parenting plans.79 Surprisingly little reference 
was made to the existing but not implemented ‘regular contact’ of section 11(4)(c) of the 
Family Law Act 1996.80  
The Children and Adoption Act 2006 introduced contact activities – parenting classes and 
information sessions on mediation – largely within a welfare frame designed to address 
co-parenting. In practice the Act offered little to the rights lobby except some limited 
(and little used) extra enforcement powers. The legislative process was therefore largely a 
process of non-decision-making designed to delay and contain.  
Following the passage of the Bill press attention shifted away from fathers’ rights, partly 
as F4J imploded81 and partly as other issues, including transparency within the family 
justice system,82 rose up the policy agenda. One of the last acts of the Labour government 
was to establish another review of the family justice system under the chairmanship of 
David Norgrove. The primary motivation was not the concerns of the fathers’ groups, but 
to look at expanding mediation and reducing the use of courts against the backdrop of the 
financial crisis.83 
Internationalisation 2010–2012  
The change of government in May 2010 signalled a significant policy shift away from 
Labour’s welfare to a rights frame. The two Coalition partners had both promised to 
address contact issues in their manifestoes. The Liberal Democrat manifesto promised a 
rights-based ‘Default Contact Arrangement which would divide the child’s time between 
their two parents’.84 The less prescriptive Conservative Party manifesto item85 was 
incorporated into the Coalition Agreement with a commitment to review family law ‘to 
look at how best to provide greater access rights to non-resident parents and 
grandparents’.86  
The obvious vehicle for addressing that commitment was the already existing Norgrove 
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Family Justice Review (FJR). The Review’s original terms of reference were retained 
with the addition of the principle that ‘The positive involvement of both parents 
following separation should be promoted’ and a new task ‘to promote further contact 
rights for non-resident parents and grandparents’.87 The FJR thus became the third major 
review of policy in ten years after CASC and the 2004 Green Paper. On this occasion the 
main struggles were not to be between political parties but between the rights lobbies and 
a welfare frame supported by a body of international research.  
While the Labour government in the UK had largely followed a process of non-decision-
making, in Australia a Liberal (Conservative) party Prime Minister had initiated major 
family law reforms, much to the delight of the Australian fathers’ rights groups. The 
centrepiece of the 2006 reforms was a presumption of equal parental responsibility and 
the requirement that courts consider equal or substantial and significant time spent with 
each parent.88 The Australian reforms proved to be an effective natural experiment to 
inform the subsequent English debates, not least as the reforms were accompanied by a 
comprehensive programme of research the results of which became available at a critical 
point in the UK policy process.  
A sequence of academic articles and submissions was produced, drawing upon overseas 
experiences from Australia as well as from Sweden where similar shared parenting 
reforms had been introduced. In advance of the publication of the Australian evaluation 
data Helen Rhoades expressed serious concerns about the Australian reforms and the 
shared time presumption and proposed instead the approach adopted by the New Zealand 
Care of Children Act 2004 which directs decision makers to investigate the needs of the 
particular child within his or her particular family circumstances.89  
Trinder90 was able to produce a rapid summary of the Australian evidence as it became 
available. The paper reviewed the evidence on the prevalence and durability of shared 
time arrangements, the satisfaction of parents and children, and the impact of shared 
residence on child wellbeing. The evidence reviewed, primarily from Australia, 
suggested that shared time could be a positive outcome where parents were able to co-
operate and where arrangements were centred around children’s needs but that shared 
time in higher conflict cases, typically following litigation, was associated with negative 
outcomes for children. Trinder noted particular concerns with the use of shared time in 
high conflict cases, where there were current safety concerns and with infants/young 
children under 4. Interestingly those Australian findings matched almost exactly the 
practice wisdom of the English judges in the 1980s and 1990s prior to expanded use of 
shared residence orders by the Court of Appeal. The review also noted a shared care 
paradox where the Australian reforms had led to a rapid expansion of the ‘wrong type’ of 
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shared time, that is amongst the high conflict litigating cases least equipped to make it 
work for children. It also noted that many parents misunderstood the reforms to mean 
automatic 50/50 shared time.  
The Norgrove team visited Sweden and Australia and also took submissions. The 
research evidence clearly made a difference. The Interim Report ruled out a shared time 
presumption or a ‘parental right to substantially shared or equal time for both parents’ but 
it did suggest that a legislative statement about the importance of a ‘meaningful 
relationship’ would be useful.91 The Review cited Trinder’s CFLQ summary of the 
Australian research that the co-operation required to make shared contact work in high 
conflict families could not be created by statute.92  
Over the summer 2011 the Australian research continued to resonate. A summary of the 
Australian and wider international findings was circulated to parliamentarians and later 
published by Fehlberg and Smyth.93 The House of Commons Justice Committee took oral 
evidence from the lead researcher on the main Australian study.94 The Justice Committee 
also ruled out introducing a shared care presumption, again based on the Australian 
experience.95 It also queried the FJR’s interim proposal for a ‘meaningful relationship’ 
suggesting it would undermine the paramountcy principle.96  
Two other papers in 2011 also drew upon international experience of shared time, both 
focusing on Sweden. Newnham97 examined the Swedish research on children’s 
experience of shared time, noting that sharing time does not make parents cooperate thus 
leaving children exposed in high conflict arrangements. Harris-Short98 noted that despite 
equality-based arguments for shared time, there has been limited convergence in gender 
and parenting roles in the UK whereas the shared custody regime in Sweden reflected 
more equal patterns of care in intact families. Harris-Short argued that family policy 
should focus more on equalising pre-separation patterns of care. 
The international research continued to impact upon English debates. In its final report 
the Norgrove panel reaffirmed its opposition to a time-based presumption.99 It also 
stepped back from its earlier proposal to introduce a ‘meaningful relationship’ 
amendment for the Children Act 1989. It noted being ‘particularly struck by further 
evidence, received from Australia’,100 that ‘meaningful’ had been misinterpreted as 
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shared time by parents and trial judges, requiring further legislation to ensure that safety 
trumped shared time presumptions. The FJR report concluded that amending the welfare 
principle would result in unnecessary risk for little gain.101 Instead, the Report returned to 
some of the core principles of the Law Commission working paper of 1986 arguing 
instead to educate parents about the meaning of parental responsibility (and presumably 
to restore its intended status). There was a single nod in the direction of a rights frame. 
The FJR proposed replacing contact and residence orders with a new child arrangements 
order as originally floated in the 1986 working paper. The rationale was the same as the 
Law Commission, that is, an equality argument.102  
While policy developments on shared time had stalled, in the courts the expansion of the 
use of shared residence orders had continued. Sonia Harris-Short103 noted that while 
parliament had rejected any shared care presumption, the Court of Appeal was setting a 
clear lead on shared residence orders. Harris-Short noted the widening circumstances in 
which shared residence orders were being made to the point that she considered the 
shared residence order was becoming normative. Subsequently in Re AR Mostyn J 
asserted that shared residence orders were nowadays ‘the rule rather than the 
exception’.104 Numerically, that is a wild overestimate of the prevalence of shared 
residence orders.105 The Court of Appeal in T v T106 also thought that it overstated the 
position and that instead the court should make the order that is in the best interests of the 
child. 
Symbolism – 2012 onwards  
The publication of the final report of the FJR ended more than a decade of policy review 
characterised by an ongoing tension between rights and welfare frames, ultimately 
resolved by reference to empirical research. That was not the end of the story. Besides the 
Coalition Agreement set within a rights frame, the new Children’s Minister was Tim 
Loughton, who had previously put forward (and lost) multiple amendments on shared 
care/shared time as Shadow Children’s Minister during the Children and Adoption 
Bill.107 The government therefore announced immediately that it would legislate on a 
shared parenting presumption, despite the FJR’s recommendations.108 It did accept the 
arguments set out against a time-based presumption based on the Australian research,109 
but stated that the continuing concerns of ‘many people … about the proper recognition 
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of the role of both parents by the courts’110 required a new presumption about the 
‘importance of ongoing relationship with both parents’.111 The new presumption would 
be framed to avoid the problems in Australia and would be ‘complementary to the 
paramountcy principle’.112 This was despite Rhoades’s prior submission about the 
additional interpretative workload for Australian judges in understanding ‘meaningful’ 
and the need for further clarifying legislation.113 Not surprisingly, the government 
endorsed the FJR’s equality frame proposal for child arrangements orders.114 
The government presented four options for a consultation on a new shared parenting 
clause in June 2012.115 Each of the four options was a variation on ‘continuing parental 
involvement’, whether as a principle, presumption or welfare checklist item. No change 
was not an option. The government’s stated preference was for a presumption and indeed 
that was what the response to the consultation produced, albeit on a rather crude count of 
the responses, many of which were from (probably highly unrepresentative) individual 
separated fathers.116  
The Justice Select Committee produced a highly critical Pre-Legislative Scrutiny report 
in response.117 It argued that the proposed child arrangements orders would be both 
difficult to understand and to operationalise.118 It was particularly critical of the draft 
clause on shared parenting which it concluded was purely symbolic: ‘included not to 
effect any change in Court orders but to tackle a perception of bias within the Courts that 
we have previously concluded has no basis in fact’.119 It recommended first that 
‘involvement’ be defined in legislation to prevent or limit any misunderstandings that it 
implied shared time, and secondly that the short title of the clause be renamed (from 
‘Shared Parenting’ to ‘Parental Involvement’).120  
In its response the government accepted the proposal to amend the title of the clause from 
‘Shared parenting’ to ‘Welfare of the child: parental involvement’121 but refused to gloss 
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‘involvement’. They set out their reasoning thus:  
‘In relation to shared parenting, the Government remains of the view that a 
legislative amendment will send an important message to parents about the 
valuable role which they both play in their child’s life. As well as helping to 
promote greater understanding about the way in which court decisions are 
made, we believe the amendment will, in time, encourage separated parents to 
adopt less rigid and confrontational positions with regard to arrangements for 
their children.’122 
No empirical evidence was offered to support those views. 
The Children and Families Bill had its first reading in February 2013. The Bill proposed 
to amend section 1 of the Children Act 1989 by inserting that a court is: 
‘to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that involvement of that parent in 
the life of the child concerned will further the child’s welfare … if that parent 
can be involved in the child’s life in a way that does not put the child at risk 
of suffering harm.’123  
Further contact and residence orders (and shared residence orders) would be replaced by 
a child arrangements order, that is: 
‘an order regulating arrangements relating to any of the following— 
(a) with whom a child is to live, spend time or otherwise have contact, and 
(b) when a child is to live, spend time or otherwise have contact with any 
person.’124 
While the Bill did not include any reference to time it still attracted highly critical 
commentary. Kaganas125 saw the Bill as an attempt to use the expressive power of the 
law to reinforce a norm and criticised the failure to take account of the research 
evidence.126  
Throughout the progress of the Bill a coalition of children’s charities had lobbied against 
any new presumption.127 The Labour and crossbench opposition focused on two types of 
amendments: to clarify that involvement does not mean any particular division of time,128 
and to replace the proposed involvement presumption with an additional welfare 
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checklist item regarding the quality of relationships with both parents.129 The Bill 
survived unscathed until the report stage in the House of Lords where an amendment by 
Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss (a former President of the Family Division), was passed by 
a narrow majority. Her amendment sought to minimise the potential for misinterpreting 
‘involvement’ as shared time by inserting ‘[involvement] shall not be taken to mean any 
particular division of a child’s time’. The clause was a paraphrase of the government’s 
Explanatory Notes to the Bill.130 Baroness Butler-Sloss in her speech noted she was not 
against the principle of involvement but was concerned to ensure clarity and help parents 
to put welfare first.131 The government subsequently accepted the amendment and the 
new definition survived the remainder of the parliamentary process. 
Taking stock  
What then has changed since the journal’s foundation in late 1988? What is clear is that 
there is considerable variation in the extent of change across the different domains of 
shared care. O’Connor was undoubtedly right that there has been a significant increase, 
or ‘climate change’, in public awareness and acceptance of shared time, although there is 
no empirical evidence as yet about public attitudes. The shift can be understood against a 
broader context of new norms about involved fatherhood and a significant increase in 
father involvement in intact families, even though convergence between the roles of 
mothers and fathers is still some way off.132 That said, for all the attitudinal changes, 
shared time remains relatively unusual amongst the general (non-court) population. 
Community studies suggest that 50/50 shared time has probably remained below 5% of 
the separated population since the mid 1990s.133  
O’Connor was also partially right about not changing the law. In terms of the statutory 
framework, there has been very little development since the implementation of the 
Children Act 1989 despite significant external pressure from various policy actors and an 
enormous amount of effort expended upon major policy reviews. The Children and 
Families Act does introduce a new statutory presumption of involvement, but the change 
is still a modest one, particularly given the gloss that involvement does not imply any 
particular time division. It is therefore a contact rather than a shared time presumption. It 
actually offers less to a rights frame than the ‘regular contact’ of section 11(4)(c) of the 
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Family Law Act 1996 and clearly much less than occurred in Australia. There has been 
no paradigm shift in this field and the welfare frame in its broadest sense is largely 
unquestioned. This is what Hogwood and Peters134 term policy maintenance (adaptation 
or adjustment) rather than policy succession (replacement) or policy termination. The 
rights frame has thus achieved considerable impact on public and media perceptions but 
secured very few concrete policy changes. In contrast, the welfare frame has continued to 
have a significant impact, although principally as a means to block policy change, 
whether in the form of the symbolic policy-making of the Children and Adoption Act 
2006 or as the principal basis to resist the rights frame during the Coalition government.  
The two shared care domains where there have been very significant changes ironically 
run in tension. Over the last few years there has been a major expansion in the quality and 
sophistication of the evidence base relating to the outcomes of shared time for children. 
There are now clear messages about when shared care is most and least likely to work for 
children. The research messages largely affirm the earlier judicial caution about ordering 
shared time in high conflict cases. In contrast, the range of cases where the courts have 
ordered shared residence or shared time have changed out of all recognition since 1988, 
led by the Court of Appeal. The result is that the number of litigated cases with shared 
residence is, as in Australia, considerably higher than in the wider separated population. 
The best estimate from recent community studies is that fewer than 5% of children have 
shared time arrangements; in court populations the proportion with shared time appears to 
have increased fairly steadily from less than 1% in the mid 1980s,135 to 7% in 2003136 to 
10% in 2013.137 Neither the increase nor the greater preponderance of shared time among 
the litigating population fits with the messages from the research that children do best in 
shared time arrangements where parents are able to co-operate. 
What accounts for these developments? At the policy level, a fit between government 
ideology and interest group proposals has clearly been important.138 A Labour 
government with a strong orientation to a welfare frame was in power for most of the 
period when the campaigning of fathers’ rights groups was at its height. There is a ready 
comparison with Australia where there were equally well-organised fathers groups, but 
with a Liberal (Conservative) rather than Labour-led government. The difference 
produced a shared care presumption in Australia rather than a defence of the welfare 
principle as in the UK. Kingdon’s multiple streams analysis of policy-making139 is 
relevant. The theory is that changes in policy are brought about when three process 
streams – problems, solutions and politics – coalesce thereby opening a policy window. 
In the UK, unlike Australia, the profile of fathers’ rights groups peaked in the mid 2000s 
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at a time when the political window was shut.  
In theory, the Coalition government offered an opportunity for the policy window to be 
reopened fully. But although the Executive is powerful it must still take cognizance of 
other policy actors with different policy goals. The welfare frame remains dominant 
amongst key policy actors: the professional groups, the children’s charities and amongst 
many parliamentarians, (including Conservative and Crossbench peers), as evinced by the 
negative or lukewarm responses to the proposals to legislate on shared parenting.  
It is also vital to acknowledge the role that research evidence has played in the policy 
process. There have been concerns expressed in the past about empirical research having 
an inappropriate influence on law and policy-making.140 This, however, was a policy area 
where empirical research evidence played a critical, and in my view, a wholly appropriate 
role.  
The research utilisation literature provides useful insights into the relationship between 
research and policy. Carol Weiss141 distinguishes between instrumental use of research 
where a study has a direct impact on policy and conceptual (or enlightenment) use where 
studies subtly shape the thoughts/beliefs of policy-makers. The latter use is generally 
seen as more common. A third ‘processual’ use notes that research may or may not be 
used depending upon fit with broader policy objectives.142  
Two of these three uses are evident in relation to shared parenting. High quality evidence, 
primarily Australian, and consistent with a welfare frame, played a direct instrumental 
role in the rejection of a shared care presumption by the FJR. It also precluded the 
adoption by the Coalition government of a quantity or time-based presumption, despite 
prior Conservative and Liberal Democrat preferences.143 There is also evidence of 
processual use, of evidence being used selected or ignored depending upon fit with 
existing policies. A notable example is the way in which the Coalition government 
distinguished the Australian evidence on public and judicial misinterpretation of shared 
care presumption when introducing its own presumption of involvement.  
This is a field where there are a range of ‘authorities’ besides research evidence. The 
rights frame has been unable to rely on research evidence and instead has been sustained 
largely by the use of personal testimonies from individual fathers. These have typically 
been in the form of modern myths144 or ‘horror stories’145 featuring a morally righteous 
victim and heartless ex-spouse. These types of individual stories can be very powerful. 
                                                
140 R Deech, ‘Divorce law and empirical studies’ (1990) 106 LQR 229. But see also M Maclean and J Eekelaar, 
‘Divorce law and empirical studies – a reply’ (1990) 106 LQR 621.  
141 C Weiss, Using Social Research in Public Policy-making (DC Heath, 1977); C Weiss, ‘The Many Meanings of 
Research Utilisation’, in M Bulmer (ed), Social Science and Social Policy (Allen Unwin, 1986). 
142 M Monaghan, Evidence Versus Politics: Exploiting Research in UK Drug Policy Making? (Policy Press, 2011). 
143 See nn 76 and 77, above, for time-based Conservative proposals and Liberal Democrat Party, Our Manifesto 2010 
(Liberal Democrat Party, 2010), http://network.libdems.org.uk/manifesto2010/libdem_manifesto_2010.pdf, at p 52. 
144 M Kaye and J Tolmie, ‘Discoursing dads: the rhetorical devices of fathers’ rights groups’ [1998] Melb U L Rev 162, 
at p 194. 
145 See J Gusfield, ‘Constructing the ownership of social problems’ (1989) 36 Social Problems 431, and S Coltrane and 
N Hickman, ‘The rhetoric of rights and needs: moral discourse in the reform of child custody and child reform laws’ 
(1992) 39 Social Problems 400. 
As Kaye and Tolmie146 found in Australia, individual stories, however partial or 
unrepresentative, can be used to make universal claims about fairness and justice that can 
have more traction with media and policy-makers than the most rigorous and systematic 
research study. A British example is the use of horror stories to suggest systematic bias 
against fathers in the family courts.147 Systematic research has indicated that the claim is 
unfounded and that the great majority of fathers get most or all of what they have 
sought.148 Nonetheless, the government’s decision to legislate on shared care was 
justified solely on the basis of individual claims of bias.149 As the Justice Committee 
pointed out, the government was planning to legislate to correct a perception that had no 
basis in fact.150 
Looking back over the last 25 years it is clear that empirical evidence has had variable 
impact across the various fora. It is interesting to note that independent 
reviews/commissions of inquiry such as the FJR and Justice Committee appear most 
amenable to research evidence. For governments receptivity to research appears to 
depend upon a fit between ideology and findings. The one area where research evidence 
is perhaps least likely to be used is by the judiciary. The focus on traditional legal 
authorities, perhaps supplemented by expert reports, appears to reduce the reliance upon 
empirical research by the senior judiciary. A wider shift within family law towards ‘rule-
based’ procedures given the attraction of norms where rights are of increasing 
significance and the resources to manage large volumes of cases ever scarcer may also be 
important.151 
Conclusion  
The changes in relation to shared care over the last 25 years have been inconsistent. 
Shared care in its widest sense has achieved the status of a social norm but shared time is 
not that much more common as a social practice. In policy terms, there is little difference 
between the Law Commission’s original proposals for equal parental responsibility and 
the possibility of shared time and the current statutory framework. Indeed the 
replacement of contact and residence orders with a child arrangements order takes us 
straight back to the Law Commission’s original proposals from 1986.152 Where there has 
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are other echoes. A concern that shared care proposals would be misinterpreted as shared time was evident in the late 
1990s as well as during the passage of the Children and Families Bill as was a desire to remove labels that parents 
been significant change over the last 25 years has been in the sophistication of the 
research evidence urging caution in the use of shared time in high conflict case. However, 
those research messages have not curbed the use of shared time in litigated cases, a 
phenomenon that has grown throughout the period and far beyond the Law Commission’s 
original intentions. 
The last 25 years have therefore been characterised by different trends, aptly though not 
comprehensively, described by O’Connor as climate change without policy change. 
Having such a gap between public and media perceptions and the law is, however, an 
unstable position and probably not sustainable in the long term. It is highly likely that 
there will be further pressure from the fathers’ groups to strengthen the new presumption 
introduced by the Children and Families Act and the task will be easier in future given 
that the principle of an additional presumption alongside the welfare principle has been 
conceded.  
The biggest changes are likely to be in practice, however. While the new presumption 
appears relatively innocuous the likelihood is that it will be interpreted by sections of the 
press and by some parents as implying equal time.153 Somewhat paradoxically, the 
removal of shared residence orders and introduction of child arrangements orders may 
also increase the number of shared time arrangements. Previously, parents seeking to 
establish their equal status had the prospect of a symbolic shared residence order to fight 
for. Under the new regime the only outlet for that desire will be in terms of an equal time 
split rather than a label. It is worth noting also that the Law Commission had predicted in 
1986 that the introduction of a single order would be likely to lead to more equal time 
shares.154  
The other major factor that may influence the development of shared care, especially 
shared time, is the change within the family justice system wrought by resource 
constraints. While the rights, welfare, and to a lesser extent, the risk frames have 
competed over the last 25 years, perhaps the one consistent frame embraced by all 
governments has been about resources. As noted above the resource frame posits 
litigation and lawyers as the problem and alternative dispute resolution as the solution.155 
The removal of legal aid from most private family law cases following LASPO,156 
however, means that more parents will self-represent. They will do so without advice 
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from an experienced family lawyer whose orientation and professional code is firmly 
within a welfare frame and therefore likely to be cautious about the use of shared time.157 
Alternatively, parties may mediate. The evidence from Australia is that parents were far 
more likely to agree shared time arrangements in mediation than in the general 
population, most of whom did not use courts or mediation.158 It is not clear whether a 
similar pattern will emerge in the UK. However, what is of concern is that unlike the 
court system where nearly half of children will be directly consulted, in the mediation 
sector very few children are involved in the process or have a neutral third party such as a 
Cafcass officer or guardian to advocate for their interests.159 That is a significant concern 
for the future, especially given Baroness Hale’s view that children’s wishes and feelings 
‘ought to be particularly important in shared residence cases, because it is the children 
who will have to divide their time between two homes and it is all too easy for the 
parents’ wishes and feelings to predominate’.160 
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